HI-878/2-RR Four Papers on the Vietnamese Insurgency General Preface
In these papers I have attempted to consider a number of alternative means to raise the level of security in South Vietnam so that the tide of allegiance begins to flow strongly against the communists.
In developing these papers I have been aware of the many important issues relative to security with which I have not dealt, or have only dealt with tangential ly. These issues have been ignored because: 1) I thought I had little to say that others haven't said; 2) I felt that they were of second priority; 3) I thought that the United States, or at least an American analyst at a distance, could have little of real use to say on these topics.
I am convineed that the evolution of a more legitimate Saigon government is crucial, and, more importantly, the collapse of the Saigon consensus could ruin all other plans. This is something to worry about and try to avoid, but this subject does not appear to be one to which we can add much to analytically.
I believe that economic, social and educational development are of great importance in South Vietnam.
Land reform is an important aspect of this, although increasing land and man productivity may be equally important.
In many parts of South Vietnam, however, the issue is more one of finding steady, remunerative employment for a locally surplus population than it is a matter of dividing up land more equitably.
I believe that the country can be made to grow now, and may really "take off" if peace is achieved.
For example, a subsidized rice price for the farmer might go a long way toward reversing production trends in the Delta.
But I do not believe that economic development is generally a very effective counter to insurgency once stated.
Indeed, the readjustments attendant on the economic development of underdeveloped countries often prepare a fertile ground for communist or other radical ideology.
I believe that there does have to be change in the Vietnamese social and political structure to accomplish the demands of a changing economic situation. There needs to be institution building. Yet the question is one of timing.
For example, a change toward greater centralization which might be desirable in 1990 might merely further disorganize society in 1970.
I am confident that there is administrative insufficiency in South
Vietnam. There need to be better men, more trained men, and a more organized national structure. However, to say this does not solve the immediate problems. My reaction is to reduce or restrict the demands on the structure rather than to imagine its rapid improvement. However, at the apex of the command structure I believe that a joint Vietnamese-American war council may help to solve the most general problem of insufficient direction and coordination.
It is necessary to have a generally accepted strategy, including priorities and standards of performance, even if we are to use a generally decentralized administration for the actual execution of plans.
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The security suggestions given in these documents stem from a number of alternative assumptions and judgments of the current scene. The first paper (A Conservative. Decentralized Approach to Pacification in South Vietnam) is based on the observation that many Vietnamese and American advisers at the district and province level believe that if they were simply provided with more resources at this 1evel--perhaps another regional force company in every district-then they could vastly improve and perhaps solve their pacification problem.
Since in most areas our conventional offensive makes it extremely difficult for the VC/NVA to match these increases at the district level, I judge that this may well be correct.
If so, then only a rather modest change in priorities may be necessary for the Vietnamese forces with almost no real location of U.S. forces. This approach stresses a primarily Vietnamese solution to the insurgency problem. To a large extent, a discussion of district emphasis and decentralization is a plea for a solution which fits GVN ' s administrative capability and which builds on the strengths available in the South Vietnamese society.
Yet this minimum approach may be insufficient. The security problem of most pro-GVN areas in the country is severe, for the war is everywhere and there is no front in terms of which success can be measured. A review of alternative counterinsurgency systems and of the present war in Vietnam suggest that we need to separate the people from the insurgents more positively than the districts can do in isolation.
(Counterinsurgency and South Vietnam: Some Alternatives)
But if we are to set up an effective frontal system, I believe we must make a major real location of all friendly forces in Vietnam. This appears to require deep fronts of patrolling, both area saturation and what I call a thickened perimeter. On the basis of this set of assumptions I have tried to look at the forces which might be required and the degree to which present deployments might have to be altered.
In addition to these questions I have tried in the remaining papers to ask what we want by way of final settlement, what we might expect to end up with if things go moderately well.
(Principles for Settlement in South Vietnam) I have also tried to inquire into the possibility of improving the morality of our position in Vietnam--maintaining stringent limits which are sometimes costly to us, but also accomplishing our objectives with less cost to everyone involved.
(Toward the Development of a More Acceptable Set of Limits for Counter insurgency)
In particular, I am thinking of the legacy of this war. What are we going to think of ourselves after it? What lessons might it have for our next one? HI-878/1 I I-RR III:
PRINCIPLES FOR SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM Negotiation should be viewed as merely another way to attain the same ends.
It might be desirable, then, to select certain themes, most of which are not new, and repeat these ad nauseum as our objectives and the objectives of South Vietnam. The content of these is given below. But these themes should be stated in quite general terms, the implication being that they will turn out strongly in our favor, while the reality may be less favorable.
Thus, within statements that an allied goal is reconciliation or the removal of U.S. troops, there would remain a great deal of room to negotiate or settle upon details of local control, time schedules of removal of troops, etc, HI-878/1ll-RR II1-3 I realize that in making these principles as plain as suggested below we will be giving away a number of "negotiating points," if negotiation should occur. But I believe that it is more important for the U.S. to look moderate and implacable, and thereby reduce the potential destabi1 ization that might accompany negotiations, if and when our leaders feel that it is either necessary or desirable to enter into them. i.e. , we requi re an explici t qu id pro quo for everything, then the s i tuation would force the parties concerned to acknowledge at least one loss for every gain, and these losses may be very hard to take in terms of "face."
Indochina Viewed as the Proper Area for Settlement
The decision to "neutralize" Laos in 1962, and the decisions not to interpose between Cambodia and her neighbors probably had a good deal to do with the magnitude of today's difficulties in South Vietnam. America has a great deal of power and influence in Southeast Asia, but it is a mystery why we have to talk about it so much. For example, in South
Vietnam it would cost little to have Saigon announce major battles and victories where this would be even vaguely appropriate. But more relevant here is the fact that nearly all of the statements I am suggesting in this paper that "we" make, might most appropriately be made and repeated by the South Vietnamese, albeit often at our urging. In many cases it would be better to get a less desirable statement from Saigon than to have us continually appear to be at the helm. The reasons for a gradual shift to more diplomatic and policy initiatives emanating from Saigon may be obvious, but let us review them.
Announcement of settlement policies by the local governments will in most cases improve the image of these governments in the eyes of both their own people and the world. Thus, the approach should improve both the stability and the ability to act of the pro-American governments. Giving them the initiative would also reduce internal pressure on the U.S. government to negotiate or settle. For as it becomes accepted that the local governments have strong interests and policies of their own which it would be dangerous for us to interfere with, it will be more difficult to demand strong U.S.
i ni tiat ives.
I believe that it is also important for settlements to be closer to the interpretation of their own self-interest that these governments seem to have than to our own standards. This will reduce later in-fighting between the allied governments. Moreover, it should make the long-term viability of any settlements greater. For at least our allies will be less likely to feel that the eventual settlements were simply imposed upon them. Reconciliation as a theme also has some broader implications than the instrumental ones of getting a larger number of defections and surrenders.
I feel that in many areas the Vietnamese, pro-government commune's attitude towards its VC members, especially those who do not try to directly oppress it, is a paternalistic one toward erring sons, towards kids who have gone astray. They would like to unite these people with their families again, to make the village whole. Diem's failure to realize this sense of community, alienated whole communes. For in going against a few communists, he hurt a whole commune--even if their sympathies were anti-communist. Thus, an officer I I 1-8
HI-878/1ll-RR in a distant province may want to kill rather than reconcile, but the local people, especially the elders, may react quite positively to this theme."
I imagine that any civilian government in Vietnam, even one headed by Thieu, might well be willing to push harder the reconciliation theme than the present mi 1itary junta.
On their part Americans should also react positively to the reconciliation theme for non-instrumental reasons.
In particular, it would improve our morale if we felt better about the discipline and behavior of the pro-GVN Vietnamese toward both VC combatants and non-combatants. /\ publicly reiterated theme of reconciliation can be used as a club to coerce behavior closer to this ideal by both Americans and reconciliation-minded Vietnamese. There is hatred however, in some communes and in regard to some VC. VC in this position should be kept in jails or re-integrated elswehere in the society.
HI-878/1Il-RR I I 1-9 it has been decided to arrange a truce that may be indefinitely extended.
"It is clear that we can win, but there is no point in further bloodletting.
It is expected that gradually our VC brothers will want to reintegrate their communities with the general society."
General Amnesty to Vietnamese Who Illegally Entered South Vietnam After 1956
One of the goals of military success under the theme of reconciliation should be to reach a point where it would be possible, at least in certain provinces, to announce a general amnesty for infiltrated North or South
Vietnamese communists in the country who give themselves up by a certain date. The suggestion here is not greatly different from present official policy toward ralliers, but it can be made to seem quite different by the nuances.
The choices given the person turning himself in should be fairly broad.
He should first of all have the choice of returning home, perhaps at a later date. Or he may choose to be treated as a regular rallier, with the chance of integration into South Vietnamese society. Finally, it might be possible to offer the communist the chance of free emigration overseas--if an arrangement could be worked out with a country willing to take these persons.
Formally or informally, this aspect of settlement should be accompanied by an attempt to arrange for a similar amnesty for GVN and allied prisoners.
The conditions of this agreement may, of course, foreclose certain aspects of what is being suggested here.
Another variation on this theme would be to emphasize the time limits involved. For example, it might be determined that a certain district was nearing pacification. In this district there might then be an announced, intensive campaign to collect and care for those turning themselves in within IH-10 HI-878/111-RR this district under the program. However, after a certain date any infiltrated communists caught will be tried for illegal entry into South Vietnam and/or other personal crimes. Thus, for this district, the infi1trator must choose to quit immediately, become a common outlaw without reprieve, or leave the district.
Phased Withdrawal of Most Large Foreign Units as an Allied Objective
A basic objective of Saigon must be to regain control over its own country. Thus, it wants the NVA out, but it also wants the vast majority of the Americans and Koreans out. While remaining friendly to the U.S., the reduction of the foreign presence should be a stated objective of Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon, as conditions permit.
There are a number of advantages to be gained here. It is now a recognized, but might be made a more explicit, policy to withdraw the U.S. military presence from Vietnamese cities as soon as possible.
In this way we certainly reduce the political harm of our presence and, on balance, may not greatly impair the effectiveness of our forces.
*An attempt to use a time limit of this kind for ARVN deserters seemed to work qui te wel1.
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In the context of a projected reduction of U.S. troops by hundreds of thousands, the added information that we expect to leave a couple of conventional divisions in the country for several years might be relatively acceptable.
I imagine that the security and peace of South Vietnam will require about one U.S. division in the highlands and one along the DMZ for some years. While the war is at its height it is probably the best time to make this a part of our announced peace policy. This conflicts with some statement on U.S. withdrawal quite carelessly made at Manila, but I think that effort should begin now to reinterpret those statements to something closer to reality.
Maintenance of a Long-Term Role for U.S. Advisers and Special Forces in Laos and South Vietnam
Just as surely as we are likely to feel we will need to maintain a couple of divisions in South Vietnam for some years to protect against the movement of major communist units back into the country, so we are likely to feel that we will need to preserve a more detailed country-wide presence in pacification and border control, particularly in the highlands.
Among other functions, U.S. advisers will act as a grass-roots source of information as to the actual build-up or potentialities of renewed communist activities. But primarily they will give the local people, especially in exposed areas, the economic and military base to defend themselves until the government can come to their aid. Vietnam from a line west of Vinh south, and to attacks on all logistic routes and troop concentrations immediately north of the OMZ. It is felt that it would be possible to attain many of the advantages now attained in a broader area by concentrating on a smaller, and attain them without the collateral casualties and civilian losses necessarily accompanying interdiction in areas with high population concentration. Looking toward problems which might arise after a general settlement, it would be well to begin now to institutionalize a right to reinstitute bombing in this restricted area if we had reason to believe that significant supplies were again being moved.
I recognize that opposing beginning the bombing of North Vietnam is not the same thing as suggesting its reduction. In the short run, at least, any reduction of bombing of North Vietnam is apt to improve North Vietnamese morale and depress GVN's. For it will be impossible to show convincingly that we were not forced to stop or reduce our effort. Nevertheless, I feel that this reduction would put us in a stronger moral position. From this position U.S.
leaders might be more apt to accept a long, slow war than they are today.
And in this sense, it may be worth it.
It is simply more difficult to believe that an America which de-escalates to this extent without asking for anything in return is not a moderate, truly peace-seeking power.
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Conclus ion
I am suggesting that we develop a set of principles applicable to both settlement and negotiation. These principles should begin now to reflect our longer term needs in the area of Indochina, so that there should be few surprises later on. Principles of settlement should also begin to emanate more from local sources than from our embassy, military commanders or Washington.
While we should strongly urge a few policies on our allies, we should allow them at the same time to build up their image in the world and before their own people. America on its own part should use the enunciation of principles as a chance to combine a renunciation of unnecessary violence with the development of a calm appearance of implacable strength at the negotiating table or in the tacit acceptance or imposition of our desires and those of our allies. Yet this implacable exterior should in fact be flexible enough to allow America and its allies to adjust to those political realities which we do not have the strength of commitment or moral surety to change.
